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Car Hacking: Accessing and Exploiting the CAN Bus Protocol
Abstract
With the rapid adoption of internet-connected and driver-assist technologies, and the spread of semi-
autonomous to self-driving cars on roads worldwide, cybersecurity for smart cars is a timely concern and one
worth exploring both in the classroom and in the real world. Highly publicized hacks against production cars,
and a relatively small number of crashes involving autonomous vehicles, have brought the issue of securing
smart cars to the forefront as a matter of public and individual safety, and the cybersecurity of these “data
centers on wheels” is of greater concern than ever.
However, up to this point there has been a steep learning curve involved in applying cybersecurity research to
car hacking. The purpose of this paper is to present a clear, step-by-step process for creating a car-hacking
research workstation and to give faculty, students, and researchers the ability to implement car hacking in their
own courses and lab environments. This article describes the integration of a module on car hacking into a
semester-long ethical hacking cybersecurity course, including full installation and setup of all the open-source
tools necessary to implement the hands-on labs in similar courses. This work demonstrates how to test an
automobile for vulnerabilities involving replay attacks, and how to reverse-engineer CAN bus messages, using
a combination of open-source tools and a commodity CAN-to-USB cable or wireless connector for under
$100 (USD). Also provided are an introduction to the CAN (controller area network) bus in modern
automobiles and a brief history of car hacking.
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INTRODUCTION 
Car hacking has been portrayed in popular media as a present danger, even 
though relatively few successful proofs of concept have been demonstrated against 
production vehicles during normal use on the highway (Miller & Valasek, 2018). 
Similarly, autonomous or self-driving cars have logged over a million miles with 
fewer accidents than the average human driver (Dixit, Chand & Nair, 2016), but 
the few crashes involving autonomous vehicles have been highly publicized, even 
when those accidents were caused by human intervention (Banerjee et al., 2018). 
With the rapid adoption of internet-connected and driver-assist technologies, and 
the spread of semi-autonomous to self-driving cars on roads world-wide, 
cybersecurity for smart cars is a timely concern and one worth exploring both in 
the classroom and in the real world (Ring, 2015).  
Automobile networks are increasingly complex, running on tens of millions of 
lines of code (Saracco, 2016), yet they employ decades-old protocols with little to 
no security (Bosch, 1991). Furthermore, the tools needed to access these networks 
are widely available for free or for very little cost. Unfortunately, the learning curve 
necessary to implement these tools has, up to this point, been rather steep, making 
it difficult for students or even experienced cybersecurity researchers to apply their 
skills to automotive networks. The purpose of this paper is to present a clear, step-
by-step process for creating a car-hacking research workstation. Using open-source 
software and a $70 cable, we can demonstrate a common vulnerability across newer 
IoT devices, the replay attack, as an easy-to-understand first attack on automobile 
networked systems.  
This paper details the implementation of a hands-on car-hacking module 
developed by the author into an ethical-hacking computer security course, 
including the setup of open-source car-hacking tools, a demonstration of a replay 
attack on a simulated controller area network (CAN), and the low-cost tools 
necessary to test for similar vulnerabilities in modern automobiles. All the software 
can be installed on a laptop or Raspberry Pi, or on a Linux virtual machine, like the 
ones typically used in an ethical hacking course featuring Kali Linux and 
Metasploit tools. And the only physical equipment needed to connect the software 
to a modern car, a USB to OBD-II cable or wireless connector, can be acquired 
easily online for under $100USD.  
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BACKGROUND 
Automobiles have become increasingly more technologically sophisticated, but 
the underlying communication system, the controller area network, or CAN bus, 
has remained either largely unchanged or backwards compatible with the 1991 
standard (Bosch, 1991). Including firmware, operating systems, and application 
software, a “typical” new car may include 100 million lines of code (Newcomb, 
2012). The 2016 Ford F150 pickup truck was unveiled not at a car show, but at the 
Consumer Electronics Show, touting 150 million lines of code (Saracco, 2016), and 
that was years ago.  
In addition to autonomous software and hardware advances like self-driving and 
driver-assist technologies, newer automobiles may include Bluetooth and standard 
Wi-Fi networking capabilities, and many even include a persistent wireless 
connection over 4G LTE. Some automobiles, including new Teslas, can even 
update their own software and firmware over 4G LTE (Alvarez, 2018). These 
network connections significantly expand the threat surface, bringing new vectors 
of attack to ever more complex automotive systems.  
Koscher et al. (2010) noted that an attacker who is able to access almost any of 
the dozens of ECUs (electronic control units), the microprocessor chips responsible 
for sensing and control, in modern automobiles could “completely circumvent a 
broad array of safety-critical systems” (Koscher et al, 2010, p. 447).  
At the same time the attack surfaces of network connectivity and system 
complexity have grown exponentially, the resources needed to attack an automobile 
have shrunk almost to zero. Using only free, open-source software and either a 
Raspberry Pi, an Android phone, or a free Kali Linux virtual machine running on 
an existing laptop, hackers can test for vulnerabilities and potentially attack a car 
via Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. For under $20, a wired or wireless OBD-II connector can 
be attached to the on-board diagnostic port (OBD-II) of a target vehicle for direct 
access to the internal workings of the automobile across any of those devices. 
Car hacking itself is surprisingly similar to hacking other networked devices. 
We can use a network sniffer to view packets as they move across the controller 
area network, or CAN bus, in an automobile. Let us first cover a brief introduction 
to the modern CAN bus, then provide some history on significant moments in car 
hacking, followed by an introduction to the open-source car hacking tools we’ll be 
using from OpenGarages.org.  
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Introduction to the CAN Bus 
The CAN (controller area network) bus in an automobile is the network that 
enables communication between the vehicle’s sensors and its various electronic 
control units (ECUs). Modern production cars can have as many as 70 or more 
ECUs (CSS Electronics, 2018), controlling the engine, airbags, anti-lock braking 
system, tail lights, entertainment system, and more. CAN itself is a message-based 
protocol standardized as CAN specification 2.0 in 1991 by multinational 
electronics and engineering company Bosch (Cook & Freudenberg, 2008). 
The CAN bus in an automobile could be thought of as a noisy, crowded, slower 
version of a traditional Ethernet LAN (local area network), except that the traffic is 
mostly UDP (user datagram protocol), a connectionless transport protocol, rather 
than the TCP (transmission control protocol) traffic that dominates most web and 
client-server networks.  
It is worth noting that not all automobile control systems run over the CAN bus. 
In addition to multiple bus architectures for sensory and control automation, 
including LIN (local interconnect network), FlexRay, and MOST (media oriented 
system transport), there are several other networks present in modern automobiles 
(Wolf, Weimerskirch & Paar, 2004). These network connections can include 
Bluetooth, GSM/LTE cellular network connections, GPS navigation, satellite radio 
as well as vendor-specific systems like OnStar. Proposals have also been made for 
more secure network messaging systems to protect critical functions. In one 
promising example, Schmandt, Sherman and Banerjee (2017) proposed a modified 
message authentication protocol to address security gaps in networks like the CAN 
bus, but automotive manufacturers have been slow to adopt these technologies. 
There are some advantages to using UDP for CAN bus automotive 
communications (Vector, 2016). For one, there are fewer communication delays 
and therefore less variation in communication timing because UDP does not require 
feedback from the receiver like TCP does. Another advantage is the ability to 
broadcast to all controllers and sensors in the controller area network, so that a 
change in an actuator, like the turn signal lever, can be reflected on the dashboard 
and carried out on the lighting circuit without requiring multiple direct wiring 
circuits. The CAN bus architecture allows all of these devices to communicate over 
as little as one pair of shared wires running to each sensor, actuator, or ECU.  
CAN bus protocol messages are small (eight bytes or less at a time), with no 
explicit addresses in the messages, just a priority value (messages from the engine 
or brakes get higher priority than the air conditioning or audio player). Although 
there is some integrity protection, in the form of a checksum, and availability 
protection in the form of error handling and retransmission of lost messages, the 
CAN bus protocol was not built with modern security controls in mind. 
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Brief History of Car Hacking 
In 2011, the first widely accepted remote compromise, or hack, of a production 
vehicle was accomplished by a team of researchers at the University of California, 
San Diego (Checkoway et al., 2011), against a 2011 Chevy Malibu. The researchers 
were able to cause the car’s brakes to lock up while driving using two different 
remote attack vectors.  
In 2015, researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek remotely controlled the 
steering, braking, acceleration, and other controls of a 2015 Jeep Cherokee (Miller 
& Valasek, 2018). They noted that automotive control messages should be 
protected with modern encryption mechanisms, like TLS, to ensure authenticity and 
integrity. The researchers reported being shocked to learn that the manufacturers 
stated they would first have to find a way to implement TCP in automotive 
networks before they could handle SSL or TLS encryption, both of which require 
establishment of a TCP session. 
Additional high-profile hacks were demonstrated against electric vehicles, 
including a 2016 Tesla Model S and a 2018 BMW i3 by Tencent’s Keen Security 
Lab. And, while most of these cyber-physical attack vectors were rapidly addressed 
by the manufacturers, fundamental security concerns remain, especially when 
physical access to the vehicle is possible. Many researchers include internet-
connected automobiles among the growing Internet of Things (IoT), and note 
significant cybersecurity concerns as once-isolated devices and machines are 
interconnected across both wired and wireless IP networks (Payne & Abegaz, 
2018). 
An Open Source Toolkit for Car Hacking 
The software we use in our car hacking module is both free and open-source, 
available from OpenGarages.org, consisting primarily of the Instrument Cluster 
Simulator, or ICSim package (OpenGarages.org, 2017). ICSim was created by car 
hacking researcher Craig Smith, author of The Car Hacker’s Handbook (Smith, 
2016). Smith’s handbook was the foundation for our original research into car 
hacking. ICSim includes both a dashboard simulator with a speedometer, door lock 
indicators, and turn signal indicators, and a control panel that allows the user to 
interact with the simulated automobile network, applying acceleration and 
controlling the door locks and turn signals. ICSim relies on other free Linux tools, 
including the CAN Utilities, or can-utils, that are available under the package 
installer repositories for most Linux distributions.  
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In the following section, we will detail the step-by-step installation and 
configuration of the ICSim software and related tools for use in a classroom, 
computer lab, or automotive research workstation, as well as running in a virtual 
machine on a commodity Windows, Mac or Linux laptop. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
At the onset of this lesson or module in a classroom environment, it is an 
opportune time to discuss ethical considerations in car hacking, and in the greater 
Internet of Things (IoT) as a whole. As we become more reliant on connected 
technologies in our daily lives, the role that security plays becomes even more 
important. As self-driving cars and driver-assist technologies continue to expand 
and improve, discussing ethical and security concerns, especially with respect to 
human safety, provides an additional opportunity for discussion in a cybersecurity 
course. Should car owners be able to test the security of their own vehicles? What 
are ethical limits for security researchers? Do car manufacturers have greater 
responsibility than other IoT device manufacturers in assuring the security of 
systems and networks in their products? Such questions can help frame the 
importance and relevance of car hacking in the context of a cyber course.  
Faculty and students familiar with Linux, especially Kali Linux for ethical 
hacking and penetration testing, will find both the setup and the use of the tools 
themselves relatively intuitive. Those with less experience, especially with less 
command-line Linux expertise, can still install and run the tools in a virtual machine 
similar to the ones used in most hands-on courses in ethical hacking.  
In our ethical hacking course, we were already using virtual machines for Kali 
Linux, so we implemented the OpenGarages.org car hacking tools on Kali, a 
Debian-based Linux distribution favored by many ethical hackers, red teams, and 
offensive security practitioners. Our implementation used Kali Linux running in a 
virtual machine under Oracle’s freely available VirtualBox platform.  
VirtualBox runs on Windows, Linux, and Mac computers and can host dozens 
of different operating systems in individual virtual machines, and even though its 
technology was acquired by Oracle, Inc., VirtualBox remains free and open-source 
under the GNU General Public License version 2. 
Installation 
This installation will assume the user has either a workstation running Kali 
Linux or a virtual machine running Kali Linux in a platform like VMware or 
VirtualBox. For the car hacking modules, we will use open-source tools from 
OpenGarages.org developed by Craig Smith.  
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Installing Dependencies 
The first step in setting up the OpenGarages.org car hacking software is 
installing prerequisite software known as dependencies. First, update Kali Linux by 
typing the update command into a new Terminal (command-line) window: 
sudo apt-get update 
Then, install the LibSDL (SDL stands for Simple DirectMedia Layer, a cross-
platform development library for computer graphics and audio) development 
libraries. LibSDL is used by the Instrument Cluster Simulator software from 
OpenGarages to draw and animate the virtual dashboard (or instrument cluster), as 
well as to access various game controllers, like the PlayStation PS3 controller 
natively supported by the software to drive the virtual car in the ICsim control 
application. 
Install both the libsdl2-dev and libsdl2-image-dev libraries with the command: 
sudo apt-get install libsdl2-dev libsdl2-image-dev 
After the LibSDL libraries are installed, add the CAN utilities. CAN is short for 
controller area network, the primary network in modern automobiles. The CAN 
utilities are included in some Linux distributions, but not in Kali as of this writing. 
The CAN utilities can be installed using the command: 
sudo apt-get install can-utils 
Once the LibSDL and CAN utilities software dependencies are in place, as 
shown in Figure 1, we can proceed to download and install the ICSim car hacking 
tools.  
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 Figure 1: After installing LibSDL and CAN Utilities software dependencies, we 
can download and install the ICSim software from OpenGarages.org. 
Downloading and Installing ICSim  
We will utilize git to download the OpenGarages.org software ICSim, short for 
Instrument Cluster Simulator. Git is the most widely used version control system, 
and is free and open-source (created by Linus Torvalds, the creator of Linux 
himself). It’s also included in Kali, as well as in most Linux distributions.  
Git will clone, or copy the ICSim project files, directly to your local computer. 
Set the directory to your home directory with the command: 
cd ~ 
That’s cd (short for change directory) followed by a tilde (~) symbol, to signify 
the user’s home directory. On Kali Linux, this is usually the directory /root/, 
corresponding to the root user.  
Download and expand the ICSim project files using git with the command: 
git clone https://github.com/zombieCraig/ICSim.git 
Git will download the project files for ICSim into a folder labeled ICSim in your 
home directory. Change into the ICSim folder and list the contents: 
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cd ICSim/ 
ls 
You should see several files, including two executable files labeled controls and 
icsim, inside the ICSim folder, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: After cloning ICSim.git, you’ll be able to cd into the ICSim folder to 
reveal the Instrument Cluster Simulator files.  
Preparing the Virtual CAN Network 
View the contents of the shell script setup_vcan.sh by typing the more 
command: 
more setup_vcan.sh 
You should see the following four lines of shell commands: 
sudo modprobe can 
sudo modprobe vcan 
sudo ip link add dev vcan0 type vcan 
sudo ip link set up vcan0 
The modprobe command is used to load kernel modules, like the CAN and 
vCAN network modules from the CAN utilities library, and the first two lines of 
the script will load these two modules to be able to communicate using CAN 
protocols on a virtual controller area network (vCAN) for our car-hacking 
simulator. The final two lines will create a new network device called vcan0 of type 
vCAN and turn the link on.  
Either type and run those four lines above, or run the shell script by typing: 
sh setup_vcan.sh 
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You can verify that the vcan0 network link is active by typing ifconfig. In 
addition to your regular network interfaces, you should now see vcan0 listed. With 
the vcan0 network link active, we can run the Instrument Cluster Simulator and the 
Control Panel to simulate a live controller area network and instrument cluster in a 
modern automobile.  
Running the ICSim Software 
The standard setup for running ICSim includes at least two components, the 
icsim Instrument Cluster Simulator program file, which simulates an automobile’s 
dashboard instrument panel, and the controls executable, which gives the user 
control of the virtual automobile, including acceleration, steering, door locks, and 
turn signals. For a first experience for beginning car hackers, it’s also instructive to 
open a third terminal window running a network sniffer to view packets on this new 
virtual CAN network.  
Open three terminal windows. In the first window, open the Instrument Cluster 
Simulator application, icsim, on the vcan0 virtual CAN network interface we 
created: 
~/ICSim/icsim vcan0 
That’s vcan0, with a zero, denoting the virtual CAN network we created by 
running setup_vcan.sh above. The dashboard instrument panel simulator will 
appear as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The icsim instrument cluster simulator represents the dashboard of a 
virtual automobile, with indicators for speed, turn signals, and door locks.  
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Nothing on the dashboard will light up, and the speedometer will remain fixed, 
because there’s no traffic on the vcan0 network yet. We’ll address that by starting 
the ICSim’s controls. In a second terminal window, open the controls app: 
~/ICSim/controls vcan0 
The CANBus Control Panel application will appear on the screen, with a GUI 
mimicking the PlayStation 3’s PS3 controller (which, by the way, is supported by 
the controls app). The keyboard controls are labeled on the controller GUI: 
acceleration is controlled with the Up arrow key, turn signals with the Left and 
Right arrow keys, and so on.  
Right-click (or control-click) on the title bar at the top of the window, and select 
Always on Top to keep the control panel app visible, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The CANBus Control Panel is launched by running the ICSim/controls 
application on virtual CAN network vcan0. Keep it visible by selecting Always on 
Top, then resize it to view both the dashboard and the controller. 
Resize the controller window so that it fits on the screen with the dashboard 
simulator. You’ll notice that the speedometer is now “idling”, or jittering slightly 
while sitting at 0 MPH. This is because the controller app is sending mild noise 
signals over the virtual CAN bus network vcan0 to simulate a real car’s CAN bus. 
The keyboard controls shown in Table 1 will only function when the CANBus 
Control Panel app is currently selected. If the dashboard doesn’t seem to be 
responding, first click your mouse in the CANBus Control Panel window, then use 
the keys given below to see changes in the IC Simulator dashboard: 
Function Key(s) 
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Accelerate Up Arrow (↑) 
Left/Right Turn Signal Left/Right Arrow (←/→) 
Unlock Front L/R Doors Right-Shift+A, Right-Shift+B 
Unlock Back L/R Doors Right-Shift+X, Right-Shift+Y 
Lock All Doors Hold Right Shift Key, Tap Left Shift 
Unlock All Doors Hold Left Shift Key, Tap Right Shift 
Table 1: Keyboard controls for the CANBus Control Panel app, and their 
associated function viewable in the IC Simulator dashboard app. 
Click the CANBus Control Panel window and press a few of the keys and key 
combinations given in Table 1 to see the virtual car take off, signal for left and right 
turns, lock and unlock doors, and so on.  
Finally, let’s view the network packets that our control panel app is sending 
across the vcan0 network to the dashboard simulator by running cansniffer, the 
CAN network sniffer included in the CAN Utilities software we installed earlier. 
From a third terminal window, run: 
cansniffer -c vcan0 
The cansniffer executable is not provided in the ICSim package; rather, it is 
contained in the can-utils software dependency we installed prior to downloading 
the ICSim software. As you can see in Figure 5, the network traffic looks similar to 
a raw tcpdump or captured packet data in Wireshark. 
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Figure 5: Cansniffer running alongside the IC Simulator and CANBus Control 
Panel, providing a network-level view of packets on the virtual CAN bus 
The cansniffer -c flag tells the sniffer to colorize bytes that are changing, which 
can help us identify bytes that vary as we interact with the CAN bus via the control 
panel app.  
With these three windows open, the icsim dashboard, the controls control panel, 
and the cansniffer network sniffer, we can see one perspective of how sensors, 
actuators, and ECUs interact over a simple CAN bus. Try accelerating all the way 
to 90 MPH, the maximum speed configured for the controller, then lock and unlock 
all the doors, and press the left and right turn signals while accelerating. The 
dashboard will reflect your keystrokes regardless of whether such combinations 
would be safe to attempt in a real vehicle.  
In the next section, we’ll see how to use this combination of tools to perform a 
common cybersecurity test by demonstrating the ability to capture packets and 
replay them on the CAN network to trigger sensors and controls without interaction 
on the part of the driver.  
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DEMONSTRATING A REPLAY ATTACK 
While deciphering the packets from the virtual CAN network is beyond the 
scope of this current work, we can demonstrate the effective use of these packets 
by attempting a replay attack. In a replay attack, a hacker captures packets from 
interesting network traffic and attempts to re-inject them into the network later to 
repeat the functionality, or to learn more about the packets by observing errors or 
other abnormal behavior in the affected devices.  
Unfortunately, many newer (and some older) IoT devices suffer from replay 
attack vulnerabilities, like Bluetooth smart locks (Benchoff, 2016), and even 
industrial control systems (Kovacs, 2017). A replay attack can be one of the first 
steps a security tester or an attacker might use in attempting to reverse-engineer a 
device’s functionality in a new or unknown network, like our virtual CAN network. 
Fortunately, just like the cansniffer software allowed us to view packets on the 
virtual CAN network interface, there are additional tools in the can-utils library that 
enable us to capture and replay those packets. In this example lab module, we’ll 
demonstrate the replay attack in two steps: capturing packets with known 
commands from the virtual CAN network traffic, and replaying those packets on 
the virtual CAN bus. 
Capturing the CAN Bus Packets 
If you still have the icsim, controls, and cansniffer windows active from the 
previous section, press Ctrl-C (control-C) in the cansniffer window to stop the 
network sniffer.  
If you’ve closed the car-hacking windows, or if you’ve restarted your Kali VM, 
you can run the following commands to recreate the vcan0 network and open the 
icsim dashboard and controls control panel on vcan0: 
cd ~/ICSim 
sh setup_vcan.sh 
./icsim vcan0 & 
./controls vcan0 & 
Note that by adding the ampersand (&) to the end of the last two commands, you 
can run both the IC Simulator and CANBus Control Panel from the same terminal 
window. The ampersand places each command in the “background”, allowing the 
user to continue working in the command line shell while a process executes. 
In a separate terminal window, run the candump tool to log all the traffic on 
vcan0 to a file: 
13
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candump -l vcan0 
Note the -l is dash-lowercase-L (not dash-one). The candump -l flag stands for 
log, or capture the CAN traffic and save it to a file. We still use the vcan0 network 
interface, because that’s the interface where our dashboard and controller are 
simulating CAN traffic.  
Immediately after starting candump, click back on the CANBus Control Panel 
window and begin pressing keys to accelerate, activate the turn signals, and lock 
and unlock doors. After a few seconds of “driving”, click back on the candump 
terminal window and press Ctrl-C (control-C) to stop the packet capture.  
List the contents of the current directory with the ls command, and you’ll see 
a new file in the format candump-YYYY-MM-DD_time.log, such as: 
candump-2019-02-23_083845.log 
This log file contains all the packets we just captured. Now it’s time to close the 
controller window and try the replay attack against our virtual CAN bus. 
Replaying the CAN Bus Packets 
Close the CANBus Control Panel window. You’ll notice the needle on the 
virtual speedometer stops “idling”, because the controller was adding the noise and 
jitter. Right now, the CAN bus is completely quiet. But, we can re-inject the packets 
we captured above and observe whether the packets will have the same effect on 
the dashboard as the real controller did. This is a simple, safe replay hack, but we’ll 
learn how to extend it to try this out on a real automobile.  
In the terminal window you were using to run the candump tool, type the 
following command: 
canplayer -I candump-2019-02-23_083845.log 
The -I flag tells canplayer to use the supplied log file as input. Note that you can 
start typing the log filename and just press the tab key (type c-a-n and press the Tab 
key to auto-complete the log file name) instead of typing the long sequence of 
digits. Also notice that you don’t have to specify which interface to use, vcan0, like 
you did with all the previous CAN utilities. This is because canplayer will replay 
the packets on the same interface they were captured on.  
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After pressing the enter key, you should see the speedometer and other 
dashboard components do the same thing they did when you captured the packets, 
as shown in Figure 6. Notice we were able to get both the left and right turn signals 
on at the same time, and unlock all the doors, while the car was going at over 90 
miles per hour! 
 
Figure 6: We can replay the packets we captured earlier using canplayer, and 
control the virtual dashboard without using the CANBus Control Panel. 
You’re able to see the same indicators, even though the car is turned “off”—
there are no controls active, but you’re changing the dashboard as if the car is 
actively running.  
In fact, if you run canplayer with the CANBus Control Panel still active, the 
speedometer will jump between its “real” value, determined by the controller app, 
and the value the canplayer app is replaying onto the virtual CAN bus.  
REVERSE ENGINEERING CANBUS MESSAGES 
For advanced students, the next step in car hacking is to reverse engineer a 
specific packet or CAN bus message to perform a particular task, like turning on 
the breaks or the turn signals, pressing the accelerator, and so on. In this section, 
we will demonstrate how to use candump, canplayer, and cansend to reverse 
engineer the CAN ID and message values of a targeted system, such as the door 
locks, accelerator, turn signal, or similar. Once the CAN ID of a particular system 
is known, and the various message values for that ID are enumerated, the hacker 
can control each feature individually with single commands set to the CAN bus.  
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Reverse Engineering the Turn Signals 
A relatively accessible first CAN system to exploit is the turn signal. We usually 
use this as a first example both because the results of a successful exploit are readily 
visible (the turn signal lights up), and because it is a good example of an innocuous 
sensor that can be used in a harmful way. Usually a turn signal is beneficial, 
allowing the driver of one car to let others know she is slowing to turn left or right. 
However, if both turn signals are lit at the same time, the effect is very similar to 
brake lights. On a busy, crowded, fast-moving interstate, a flash of brake lights can 
cause drivers to slam on their brakes, potentially causing multiple accidents.  
To achieve control of a car’s turn signals through reverse engineering, we will 
need to capture a baseline set of CAN packets with the signals turned off. Then, we 
will capture a set of CAN packets with the right turn signal active. Using a type of 
binary search, we will divide each packet capture in half, and replay each half until 
one packet lights up the right turn signal. We then recursively divide each “good” 
packet in half until we isolate the single CAN message that is responsible for 
lighting the turn signal. Once we have the CAN ID of that packet, we can modify 
the data values in the message to discover both the left and right turn signal values, 
turning off the signal, and turning on both signals at the same time. 
Capturing a Baseline CAN Dump with No Turn Signals 
With the IC Simulator, CANBus Control Panel, and a Terminal window open as 
in the previous section, start candump in the Terminal: 
candump -l vcan0 
Do not interact with the controller, just capture about a second’s worth of packets 
with no turn signals running. (Note: If you’re trying to reverse engineer a CAN 
control that toggles, like door locks, you may need to capture a baseline in which 
you re-lock the doors, or perform an opposite action to whatever action you’re 
trying to replay.) Stop the packet capture by pressing Ctrl-C. Rename the resulting 
candump log file something memorable like baseline. 
mv  candump-2019-03-02_102411.log  baseline 
With the baseline, or lights out, file captured, it’s time to capture the right turn 
signal, and reverse engineer the CAN ID responsible for showing the turn signals.  
Reverse Engineering the CAN ID of the Turn Signals 
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Next, capture a candump of the right turn signal for a second or two. To do this, 
start candump in the Terminal window, switch immediately to the CANBus Control 
Panel and press the right arrow on your keyboard. After about a second, switch 
back to the Terminal window and stop the candump by pressing Ctrl-C. 
The process we’ll use to reverse engineer the individual CAN ID of the turn 
signal is to split the candump file in half recursively until we have a single CAN 
packet or message that will light the right turn signal.  
First, determine the number of lines (the candump format is plain text, one line 
per CAN message) in the most recent capture: 
wc -l candump-2019-03-07_102721.log  
9761 candump-2019-03-07_102721.log 
The Linux word count command wc -l (dash l as in lines) will count the 
number of lines in a file. Above, the command reports that there are 9,761 lines in 
the couple of seconds of candump logs we captured.  
Replay the log file to make sure it does, indeed, show the right turn signal: 
canplayer -I candump-2019-03-07_102721.log  
If the turn signal does not light up, go back and capture the turn signal again. 
Once the signal lights up, close the CANBus Control Panel so that it will not 
interfere in the reverse engineering steps to follow.  
Recursively apply the following steps: 
1. Split the previous log file into two approximately equal halves: 
split  -l  5000  candump-2019-03-07_102721.log  x1 
The Linux split -l (again, dash l as in lines) command will split the 
file into multiple files containing the specified number of lines (we began 
with almost 10,000 lines, so we used 5,000 as the first split value). The 
x1 (x one) at the end of the command specifies the prefix for the resulting 
files; the two files produced above will be named x1aa and x1ab.  
2. Play each half until the turn signal lights up on the dashboard: 
canplayer -I x1aa 
canplayer -I x1ab 
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If the first command lights the right turn signal, there is no need to run 
the second command. If not, run the second command. Because the 
original complete file turned on the signal, at least one of these two 
halves should also turn on the signal. If both work, we’ll arbitrarily pick 
the first file each time for further analysis. 
Note: The turn signal is a simple on/off value, so it is easy to spot. If the 
CAN system you’re trying to reverse engineer is more subtle or 
continuous, like acceleration, braking, or turning up the stereo volume 
or A/C temperature, you may want to wrap the canplayer command in a 
for loop to be able to spot shorter or incremental effects: 
for i in {1..10}; do canplayer -I x1aa ; done 
3. Reset the dashboard by playing the baseline to clear the turn signal: 
canplayer -I baseline  
The turn signal should return to the off state. This is necessary because 
our dashboard will continue to show the turn signal as on, or lit up, until 
an off state is received.  
4. Go back to Step 1, splitting the number of lines in the “good” packet 
capture (either x1aa or x1ab above, whichever lights the signal) roughly 
in half (2500, 1250, 640, 320, 160, 80, 40, 20, 10, 5, 3, 2, 1), and 
incrementing the prefix (x2, x3, and so on) each time: 
split  -l  2500  x1aa  x2 
The two new resulting files will be named x2aa and x2ab. Repeat steps 
2-4 until your “good” file consists of one line that turns on the right turn 
signal.  
Students familiar with the power of the binary search will recognize that this 
process will take surprisingly few iterations. Even an initial packet capture of 
1,000,000 lines (approximately 220) will require only 20 iterations to identify the 
single CAN message responsible for turning on the signal. Here are the last few 
rounds of one example: 
split -l 4 x11ab x12 
canplayer -I x12aa 
canplayer -I baseline 
split -l 2 x12aa x13 
canplayer -I x13aa 
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canplayer -I x13ab 
canplayer -I baseline 
split -l 1 x13ab x14 
canplayer -I x14aa 
canplayer -I x14ab 
The x14ab file in this example is a single line long, and it turns on the right 
signal. Let’s look at the contents: 
more x14ab 
(1551972443.099502) vcan0 188#02000000 
The timing of the packet is at the start of the line, the CAN network vcan0 is 
next, then the CAN ID of the turn signal, 188, followed by the hash symbol # and 
the data responsible for turning on the right turn signal: 02000000. 
We have successfully reverse engineered the CAN ID of the turn signal! We can 
verify this by resetting the dashboard with the baseline, then running the cansend 
command with the correct CAN ID and data, as follows: 
canplayer -I baseline 
cansend vcan0 188#02000000 
The turn signal is on! Now that we have the CAN ID of the turn signals, it’s time 
to perform the last step, and take full control of the turn signal system. 
Enumerating CAN Data Values and Gaining Full Control of a CAN System 
Once we have the CAN ID of the turn signals, it’s time to modify the data values 
in the message to discover both the left and right turn signal values, turn off the 
signal, and turn on both signals at the same time. 
First, we know that we can light up the right turn signal with the CAN message 
188#02000000. Visually inspecting the data value, 02000000, a logical next value 
to try might be 01000000. With the IC Simulator still running, type: 
cansend vcan0 188#01000000 
The left turn signal lights up! Next, let’s try all zero values for the data : 
cansend vcan0 188#00000000 
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Both turn signals go dark with the zero data values. This means that if we can 
inject 188#00000000 signals repeatedly on the CAN bus (e.g. with a for loop, as 
noted in the previous section), we can effectively suppress or silence the turn signal. 
This is not likely to be catastrophic alone, but it could induce stress on a driver as 
well as other vehicles behind him or her.  
Last, but not least, let’s go for the pièce de résistance: Can we turn on both the 
left and right turn signals at the same time? A little familiarity with binary 
arithmetic helps here: 
cansend vcan0 188#03000000 
The data value 03000000 on CAN ID 188 lights both the left and turn signals at 
the same time! We have achieved the effect of emergency lights or a simulated pair 
of brake lights, potentially enough to disrupt a driver or several drivers in traffic. 
 
Figure 7: We have successfully reverse engineered the CAN ID and data 
values needed to hack the turn signals, gaining full control of both turn signals in 
the IC Simulator. 
In just a few steps, we have gained complete control of the turn signals in a 
simulated vehicle. This would be an opportune time to discuss ethical concerns with 
students: when could this hack be applied ethically? What are some of the potential 
side effects of this attack if used unethically? What greater impact could an attack 
like this have if it could be aimed at multiple vehicles simultaneously? 
One area of ethical application of these tools is in vulnerability testing 
(Jafarnejad et al., 2015). In much the same way we can use ethical hacking 
techniques to find vulnerabilities and harden computers, ethical car hacking can 
lead to more secure vehicles.  
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While the examples above are simulated safely in a lab environment, the tools 
needed to connect a researcher’s Kali laptop to a physical automobile are 
inexpensive and widely available.  
Connecting to a Real Automobile 
On a lab computer, car hacking is a theoretical exercise, but by adding a $20 
ODB-II to USB cable you can purchase online, like the one shown in Figure 8, you 
can plug into your car’s on-board-diagnostic port (or OBD-II port, usually found 
under the steering wheel near the driver’s side floorboard) and see the results of 
CAN messages on your Windows, Linux, or Mac computer.  
 
Figure 8: You can purchase a USB to OBD-II adapter cable to connect your 
computer to almost any post-1996 automobile’s on-board-diagnostic (OBD) port, 
for just around $20-30USD online.  
The OBDLink SX is an inexpensive and widely available piece of hardware for 
home mechanics and car hackers alike. In this section, we’ll detail how to connect 
such an OBD to USB cable to the Kali VM used in previous sections.  
To connect to the OBDLink cable shown for the first time, it’s helpful to install 
the ScanTool software from ScanTool.net (Hobbs, 2015), available as an apt-get 
package: 
sudo apt-get install scantool 
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You can plug the OBD-II cable into your laptop or computer using the USB 
adapter end, plug the OBD-II connector into your car’s OBD port under the steering 
wheel on the driver’s side near the floorboard, and turn on the automobile’s 
ignition. If you’re using a virtual machine, you’ll need to connect the USB device 
to your VM in VirtualBox by selecting Devices > USB > ScanTool OBDLink (or 
similar), as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: You can connect a physical OBD-II to USB cable to your virtual 
machine in VirtualBox by going to the virtual machine’s menu and selecting 
Devices > USB > ScanTool OBDLink (or the name of your OBD-to-USB cable). 
The ScanTool software will connect to automobile’s CAN network to perform 
tasks like reading diagnostic codes (and resetting them, like your mechanic does 
when he changes your oil, etc.), reading sensor data (with room for over eight pages 
of sensors to accommodate most modern vehicles), and more. The Linux version 
of the ScanTool GUI is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: The free ScanTool software that works with several types of OBD-II 
to USB cables has an easy-to-use GUI interface, as well as all the drivers you need 
to be able to read data from the CAN bus of most modern vehicles.  
With a slightly more capable CAN-to-USB converter, like CANable,  CANtact, 
or Korlan USB2CAN, all available for under $75USD, you should be able to read 
raw CAN packets and attempt some of the same replay attacks mentioned above 
(capturing the left turn signal for a few seconds, turning off the turn signal, then 
reinjecting the packets using canplayer to see if the dashboard indicator blinks—or 
if the actual turn signal lights on the outside of the car flash). Remember, though, 
that the effects of packet injection can cause unpredictable behavior, and should 
only be attempted in a safe environment on a vehicle you can afford to take to a 
real mechanic.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has provided detailed instructions for setting up free, open-source 
car-hacking software for instructional or research use. We also described how to 
add an inexpensive (under $100USD) physical cable or wireless connector capable 
of connecting to modern production vehicles through the OBD-II on-board-
diagnostic port. 
We have implemented this module in two ethical hacking courses, one at the 
undergraduate level and one at the graduate level, and have found significant 
student interest in the material. We have also included a complete tutorial in an 
online ethical hacking course with over 5,000 students enrolled (Payne, 2018). In 
addition to working successfully with college students in implementing replay 
attacks as described in this work, we added the car-hacking module to two high-
school cyber summer camps under the NSA GenCyber grant program. The students 
were able to effectively and accurately reproduce the replay attacks, facilitating 
both their understanding of the car-hacking material itself and their ability to work 
with network sniffers like Wireshark and tcpdump.  
In all cases, students were able to master the material quickly and displayed great 
interest and motivation. In fact, the “hacking the car-hacking software” extension 
to the module came from one of the high-school summer cyber camps, and one of 
the students demonstrated how to edit the source code and create the “wrap-around” 
speedometer effect to his peers in class.  
From the foundation provided by the open-source ICSim package from 
OpenGarages.org and the free ScanTool software from ScanTool.net, students and 
researchers alike can apply these tools to test various car-hacking scenarios, and 
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In the near term, we plan to expand the car hacking module to include more 
hands-on testing with faculty (and student) automobiles of various makes and 
models, as well as encourage the students to make further modifications to the 
software to customize it to suit additional test cases. In the long term, we hope to 
acquire an electric vehicle with LTE cellular connectivity (like the Nissan Leaf, 
Chevy Bolt, or Tesla Model 3) to extend this research to include wireless and 
remote vulnerability testing with no direct connection to the OBD-II port necessary. 
We also hope to survey students formally to gather relevant data for determining 
whether car hacking had a significant impact on student outcomes in ethical 
hacking and related courses as future research. 
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